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What does cognitive therapy change? - It 




There is still a good deal of debate about the exact process of therapeutic change in 
cognitive therapy. The search for the definitive mediator has not yet provided any 
coherent answers. This investigation examines the possibility that cognitive therapy 
affects the way we retrieve negative memories, leading to more effortful processing 
and reappraisal of material that does not help emotional wellbeing. It is argued that 
this could be a key element of the change process. 
Keywords: cognitive therapy; CBT; autobiographical memory; depression 
Introduction 
When a person becomes depressed and goes to their GP, they will be assessed using 
a number of fairly crude diagnostic criteria. How do they feel (hopeless/helpless)? 
How are they coping at work? How are their sleep pattern, appetite, concentration, 
and temper? The GP may note whether the person is weepy, self critical (‘I’m 
useless!’) and so on. Having decided that the patient meets the criteria for 
depression, the GP is most likely to prescribe an anti-depressant, request a review in 
a couple of weeks and then leaves the person to get on with it. In reality this process 
works reasonably well. The majority of sufferers recover within a fairly short time 
(generally less than six months) and most of these will go on to lead perfectly good 
and happy lives without further ado and without relapsing. Indeed, given that 
modern antidepressants work pretty well for many people, the validity of ‘talking 
therapies’ such as cognitive therapy may be open to question. 
There is now a wealth of research papers comparing the efficacy of drugs and 
different forms of psychotherapy, many with equivocal findings. Indeed a 
comprehensive Health Technology Assessment research project (King, Sibbald, Ward, 
Bower, Lloyd, Gabbay and Byford, 2000) found that in primary care based treatment 
of depression and anxiety there was no difference between non-directive 
counselling, cognitive–behaviour therapy and usual GP care at 12-month follow-up. 
However, there does appear to be a consistent thread through the literature that 
supports the usefulness of certain kinds of psychotherapy. Thus, psychotherapy, in 
particular cognitive therapy, appears to confer some resilience to future episodes of 
depression, a resilience not conferred by the administration of antidepressants. In the 
jargon of depression research, it reduces vulnerability. Since a significant proportion 
of people who become depressed go on to have further episodes, any reduction in 
depression vulnerability sounds useful (see Ingram, Miranda and Segal, 1998 for a 
most elegant discussion of this area). The important question then surrounds the 
basic mechanics of cognitive therapy, thus: ‘what does psychotherapy change inside 
my head that is not changed by antidepressants?’ 
The change process: How does therapy work? 
The action of modern antidepressant medication is well described (Feighner, 1999). 
The general principle is this. Depression is caused by a neurochemical imbalance in 
the brain, which is corrected by antidepressant medication. So, if a depressed 
person’s brain is short of serotonin, a Selective Serotonin Reuptake Inhibitor (SSRI) 
will prevent the brain absorbing so much serotonin, and the imbalance is corrected. 
There are one or two major flaws in the argument (see Andrews 2002) but by and 
large the logic is sound. Unfortunately for psychotherapy, cause and effect is not 
quite so obvious. 
The research community has engaged in all kinds of interesting exercises to identify 
the important changes that take place inside people’s heads as a result of 
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psychotherapy and have not come up with much. There is good evidence that 
psychotherapy does have very positive outcomes. Research by colleagues in 
Wakefield (Lucock, Leach, Iveson, Lynch, Horsefield & Hall, 2003) highlight a range of 
indicators that suggest that people get better after different types of ‘talking’ 
therapy. For instance, routine measures like the Beck Depression Inventory (Beck, 
Ward, Mendelson, Mock, & Erbaugh, 1961), or more recently the Clinical Outcomes 
in Routine Evaluation – Outcome Measure (CORE – OM: Barkham, Margison, Leach, 
Lucock, Mellor-Clark, Evans, Connell, Audin & McGrath, 2001) show impressive 
improvements over the course of psychotherapy and at follow-up. Other measures 
such as self-esteem, social anxiety, and interpersonal functioning provide further 
testimony to the effectiveness of different psychotherapeutic approaches, 
particularly cognitive therapy (Blackburn and Twaddle 1996). Social indicators like 
employment are also useful as outcome measures (Billings, Cronkite, & Moos, 1983), 
but none of these ‘outcomes’ tell us much about the ‘process’ of psychological 
change, or what goes on inside a person’s head after talking to a psychotherapist. 
Some researchers have tried to get a lead on this by predicting what should happen 
to a person if a particular model of psychotherapy really works according to the basic 
principles that guide it. Another term for this is its ‘mode specific action’. Thus, 
psychodynamic psychotherapy, which aims to uncover and resolve unconscious 
conflicts, might be expected to lead to ego-strengthening. On the other hand 
cognitive therapy, which aims to identify and correct unhelpful thoughts, should lead 
to less dysfunctional thinking. However, investigations of the ‘mode-specific actions’ 
of different types of therapy for depression have failed to show much in the way of 
predicted differences (Imber, Pilkonis, Sotsky, Elkin, Watkins, Collins, Shea, & Leber, 
1990). 
A number of cognitive phenomena have been proposed as ‘mediators’ of change in 
depression, including automatic thoughts and underlying assumptions and beliefs 
(Whisman, 1993, DeRubeis, Evans, Hollon, Garvey, Grove, & Tuason, 1990). Such 
phenomena sound logical but are quite difficult to measure accurately and tend to 
be a bit unpredictable. There are instruments for exploring our cognitive distortions 
and unhelpful thinking patterns, for instance the Dysfunctional Attitude Scale 
(Weissman and Beck 1978) and the Automatic Thought Questionnaire (Hollon and 
Kendall 1980). These have been investigated in some detail over the course of an 
episode of depression, and there is some supportive evidence to the effect that, as 
people recover from depression, the scores on these measures subside (Ingram, 
Miranda and Segal, 1998). However, as Whisman (1993) points out, there are 
particular difficulties with global (overall) scores for measures such as the DAS. Thus, 
Power, Duggan, Lee, & Murray (1995) report a general insensitivity of the global score 
of the DAS, while subscales such as the dependency subscale (the sum of all responses 
about dependency) revealed differences between recovered depressed and non 
depressed groups. 
The general conclusion is that self-report measures of cognitive vulnerability should 
focus on specific rather than global effects, a finding supported by a more recent 
longitudinal survey of depression (Farmer, Harris, Redman, Mahmood, Sadler, & 
McGuffin, 2001) which reported an inconsistent relationship between DAS scores and 
recovery from depression. Basically, sometimes the scores seemed to follow the path 
of recovery and sometimes they didn’t change at all. Such findings suggest that 
recovery can take place in the absence of cognitive change, implying that in some 
people depression vulnerability remains long after overt recovery; in effect it is 
‘latent’ or dormant. Indeed some researchers have explored this latent aspect of 
depression and have concluded that depressed thinking may not show itself unless 
the appropriate emotional state is also activated. Thus Miranda, Persons, & Nix Byers 
(1990) managed to alter DAS scores (creating depressed thinking) by inducing low 
mood in experimental participants. They concluded that depressed thinking styles 
were actually mood dependent, a finding that on the surface appears obvious, but 
suggests that moods create thoughts rather than the other way round, which is the 
standard line pushed by cognitive therapists. This is undoubtedly rather confusing. 
Whisman (1993) also laments the relative lack of what he calls ‘nonintrospective’ (not 
directly examining one’s own thoughts or feelings) experimental paradigms being 
used in the exploration of mediation in cognitive therapy. He cites examples from the 
literature of non-questionnaire methods that have been developed for the 
assessment of self-schema (Safran, Segal, Hill, & Whiffen, 1990). Many of these 
methods involve such measures as memory response latencies or recall scores (how 
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long it takes to recall a memory or the amount of the memory recalled). Indeed, 
memory has become well established as the cornerstone in depressed thinking 
(Williams 1997). Firstly, it can become biased so that a depressed person only tends to 
recall negative events (Lloyd & Lishman 1975). Secondly, memory can become 
‘overgeneral’. In this case a depressed person may find it very hard to recall specific 
events, tending to lump things together into categories. They remember ‘being at 
school’ but find it hard to remember a particular day at school - the detail seems to 
have disappeared. The tendency to recall negative events more easily is not, 
apparently, simply because depressed people have fewer positive events in their lives. 
Teasdale and Fogarty (1979) demonstrated this by studying a sample of student 
volunteers who were not depressed and manipulating their mood using a ‘mood-
induction procedure’. They replicated the negative recall tendency with depressed 
mood, but also discovered that negative moods did not so much speed the retrieval 
of negative events as slow down the recall of positive events. Interestingly, in a recent 
article, Sheppard & Teasdale (2000) used speed of response to the Dysfunctional 
Attitude Scale and neutral statements to investigate the different ways these items 
were judged by depressed and non-depressed people. They found that non-
depressed people tended to slow down when confronted with responses that veered 
towards a negative item or event (e.g. “People should be criticised for their 
mistakes”), whereas depressed people showed no selective slowing of this sort. This 
finding suggested that depressed people are prone to absorb negative thinking into 
their lives without a second thought (as it were) while the non-depressed population 
tend to spend a bit more time weighing it up. 
All of this points to the complexity of depression, depressed thinking and the 
inherent difficulty understanding the mechanics of cognitive change. However, it 
bodes well for Whisman’s (1993) conclusion that support for the cognitive mediation 
hypothesis would be enhanced if it could be shown that cognitive therapy produced 
specific effects on these nonintrospective measures of cognitive operations and 
structures, as well as producing effects on the other ‘outcome’ measures mentioned 
above. The findings above suggest that the impact of cognitive therapy (and other 
talking therapies) may more reliably be reflected in such ‘nonintrospective’ measures, 
but as yet no study has used them as a way of comparing the outcome of different 
therapeutic approaches in the treatment of depression. In particular, it would be 
interesting to compare talking treatments to anti-depressants. 
Aims of the study 
This study focused on response latencies to autobiographical memory recall (the time 
taken to recall a memory about particular events in our lives), a nice solid 
nonintrospective measure as referred to by Whisman (1993). The design was what is 
known as ‘cross-sectional’, aiming to compare recall response latencies in the 
following three groups of people. 
• People who were currently depressed at the time of the study. (CD) 
•	 People who had recovered from depression using antidepressants alone. 
(RAD) 
• People who had recovered from depression using cognitive therapy. (RCT) 
This report is based on findings that were part of a broader study to be reported 
elsewhere (Lister, Barton and Morley 2003). The broader investigation used the 
Autobiographical Memory Test (Williams and Broadbent 1986), which focuses on the 
ability of depressed people to recall specific events from different parts of their lives. 
This involves the use of record cards with single words on them as ‘cues’ for memory 
retrieval. The study included two additional variables, the positive or negative tone 
of the cue word (otherwise known as valency) and the time period (otherwise known 
as epoch) from which the memory came (recent or remote). So for the purposes of 
this report, cue valency refers to the word used to elicit the memory (happy, sad, 
shame, treat etc), and epoch refers to one of 2 time periods; recent (the last 12 
months), or remote (5 to 10 years ago). The time taken to retrieve a memory was of 
interest because of its non-introspective qualities. The point of this was to use 
naturally occurring data to test a particular theory. Previous studies using the 
Autobiographical Memory Test have not found particularly revealing results in 
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relation to latency. Some investigators (Kuyken & Dalgleish, 1995; Williams & Scott, 
1988) did not find any differences in the time taken to retrieve memories for groups 
of depressed and non-depressed people, regardless of whether the cue words were 
positive or negative. Other investigators, (Pierce, Morley and Trepka, 1995, Williams 
& Dritschel 1992) did find significant effects across both groups according to the time 
period (epoch) from which the memory was being sought. This showed (perhaps not 
surprisingly) that more remote memories took longer to retrieve than recent 
memories. Thus, it seemed to take more time to access a memory that was further 
away in time. The difference between this investigation and prior studies was the 
nature of the groups under scrutiny. In this study direct comparisons could be made 
between a depressed group (CD) and two ‘recovered’ groups that had experienced 
different treatments for their depression (RAD and RCT). This would hopefully 
highlight any differences in the impact of the two treatments. 
Hypotheses 
The main hypothesis was that there would be a difference between the three groups 
in the time taken to retrieve memories when dealing with negative material. In 
keeping with the study by Shepherd and Teasdale (2000) the experimental 
assumption was that depressed people would have faster latencies to negative cue 
words than the two groups of people who had recovered from depression. The group 
receiving cognitive therapy would show the slowest response latency. Thus, the 
depressed group would very rapidly latch onto miserable memories whereas the 
cognitive therapy group would slow down as they encountered something that led 
them down that path, perhaps (as a result of therapy?) trying to steer away from 
negative memories or interpretations of the world. 
The performance of the group of people who had recovered from depression using 
antidepressants alone would lie somewhere in-between. Where positive cue words 
were used it was expected that this difference would disappear. 
Participants 
Participants were recruited through a local primary care service, and from the 
caseloads of practitioners in an adult psychological therapy service. Practitioners of 
CBT included 2 CBT trained nurse therapists, two clinical psychologists with a 
background in CBT, a counsellor with additional CBT training and a General 
Practitioner who worked in the department as a cognitive therapist. A standard letter 
of invitation was sent to potential participants who could opt-in if they felt inclined. 
The two groups who had recovered from depression were treatment and symptom-
free at the time of testing, and had been so for at least three months. The currently 
depressed group were recruited from both services. All participants were paid a small 
honorarium to cover their expenses. A total of 51 people joined the project with 
exactly 17 in each group. 
Criteria for inclusion and allocation of 
participants to groups 
The Inventory to Detect Depression over a Lifetime (IDDL: Zimmerman and Coryell, 
1987) was used to establish that all participants had experienced at least one episode 
of major depression within their lifetime. The Beck Depression Inventory (BDI-2: Beck, 
Steer, & Brown, 1997) was used to validate their current depression status (depressed 
versus non-depressed). A BDI score of 17 was used as the cut-off for depression. 
Whilst this may appear high (10 is often viewed as a cut-off for depression), it is quite 
consistent with other research and provides greater differentiation than lower scores. 
Thus, a BDI score of 17 almost guarantees an accurate diagnosis of depression (see 
BDI -2 manual). The mean Beck Depression Inventory Scores were as follows: 
CD=25.06, RAD=8.35, RCT=9.0. This meant that whilst there was no (statistical) 
difference between RAD and RCT, at the time of testing both these ‘recovered’ 
groups were significantly different to the CD group in terms of symptoms of clinical 
depression. Although this may seem a bit obvious, it was important to establish that 
this was the case. In other ways, the groups were very well balanced. They were 
equivalent in terms of IDDL total symptom score and there was no difference in 
average age (mean = 45.5). There were more women than men in all three groups, 
this proportion being slightly greater for the CD group. 
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Measuring the time taken to retrieval of 
memory 
The latency to first retrieval was recorded in seconds for all memories using a 
conventional stopwatch. After some dedicated practice to orient them to the time 
period (last year, 5 - 10 years ago), participants were given cue words (e.g. happy, 
funny, shame, misery) on a record card and asked to indicate verbally (“got one!”) as 
soon as they had found a memory associated with the cue. Mean latencies for 
individuals and groups were then calculated according to epoch and cue word tone, 
as detailed in table 1. 
Table 1 – Mean (average) time to first retrieval 
Time to retrieval (secs) Recovered Recovered Currently Total 
(Standard deviation) Anti-depressant CBT depressed 
Epoch one (last year)

Positive valency (tone) 16.3 (10.0) 19.8 (9.0) 11.7 (5.2) 15.9 (8.8)

Negative valency (tone) 17.4 (7.2) 17.8 (8.7) 12.4 (6.2) 15.8 (7.8)

Epoch two (5 to 10 years ago)

Positive valency (tone) 16.1 (8.3) 20.4 (8.8) 18.8 (10.5) 18.4 (9.2)

Negative valency (tone) 18.2 (9.9) 25.0 (12.0) 14.9 (9.0) 19.4 (11.0)

Results 
Simply observing Figure 1 gives a pretty good impression of any differences between 
the groups. Thus, there appear to be clear differences between the depressed group 
(CD) and the recovered cognitive therapy group (RCT) in the speed of retrieving 
negative memories from both the recent and remote epochs. Differences between 
either of these two groups and the recovered anti depressant group (RAD) are not so 
clear. This seems to support the hypotheses above that depressed people are faster 
than people who have recovered from depression. However, the aim of this study was 
to demonstrate that any differences were ‘real’, and not just due to chance. This 
involved the use of well-tried mathematical procedures that can calculate the 
probability of these findings being meaningful. 
A repeated measures Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) was used to explore within group 
and between group differences in the time taken to retrieve a memory. Essentially 
this tells us whether the three groups differ in speed of recall taking into account the 
Fig 1 – Mean time to retrieve memory 
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emotional tone of the cue word, and the epoch from which the memory came and 
all of the combinations of valency and epoch that could possibly exist. The results of 
the ANOVA are set out in table 2. 
Table 2 – Repeated measures ANOVA on latencies to 
first retrieval 
Effect df Mean square F p 
Between subjects






1 461.10 6.596 .013* 
Epoch 2 95.72 1.369 .264 
Epoch * group 48 69.91 
Error 1 9.28 .320 .574 
Valency 2 51.69 1.781 .179 
Valency * group 48 29.02 
Error 1 14.14 .471 .496 
Epoch * valency 2 132.30 4.409 .017* 
48 30.01 
Epoch x valency x group 
Error 
Main analysis 
The important numbers in Table 2 are the ones with an asterisk beside them. These 
indicate a difference between the groups that is beyond chance. This kind of 
difference is often referred to as a ‘significant’ difference. Having spotted a potential 
difference between the groups further calculations need to be done to see which 
group or groups are different from which. Comparing and contrasting groups like 
this is often called ‘post-hoc’ statistics’. 
In this study there were significant differences between the three groups in speed of 
retrieval. Further examination using post hoc tests revealed that the only real 
difference was between the CD group and the RCT group. The RAD group was hung 
in between and showed itself to be no different to the RCT or the CD groups. In 
keeping with the results of other studies, all three groups were significantly slower 
at retrieving memories from the remote epoch (5 to 10 years ago) as opposed to the 
recent (last 12 months), but this slowing seemed more or less the same across the 
three groups. 
However, the most interesting and meaningful finding emerged when the emotional 
tone of the cue word and the time period (epoch) of the memory were considered 
together. In this analysis, the post-hoc tests revealed that, with more distant 
memories, the RCT group were significantly slower than the CD group in the retrieval 
of recollections that were responses to negative cues. This may seem a bit of a leap 
of faith, but in this case we were looking at the impact of two different variables and 
combining them. Firstly we looked at the effect of the positive or negative attributes 
(valency) of the cue word, and secondly we examined the effect of the recentness of 
the time period from which the memory came. This let us look at somewhat more 
detailed questions. We knew from the first ‘trawl’ of results that the recentness effect 
(more remote memories take longer to retrieve) affected all three groups about the 
same. However, was this effect consistent if we took into account the valency of the 
word that was acting as a cue for the memory? This study revealed a very 
pronounced difference in the way the groups behaved, best described as a relative 
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slowness on the part of the RCT group in retrieving memories that came from a more 
distant time period and which were cued by words that were negative. For the most 
part (about 99%), these memories were themselves emotionally negative. The 
following is an attempt to summarise these results and make sense of them in terms 
of different responses to treatments. 
Discussion:

what's this got to do with cognitive therapy?

In cognitive therapy the process of change is brought about through a range of 
techniques that may well affect the way events are remembered. Tools like automatic 
thought records and positive data logs (Greenberger and Padesky, 1995) help people 
to look carefully at their memories of past events and to reappraise difficult 
(negative) emotional experiences. The therapeutic process also involves identifying 
the assumptions and core beliefs an individual holds with a view to changing those 
that are clearly unhelpful. The way a person makes sense of their world is bound to 
depend on their past experiences and therefore, by default, beliefs and attitudes will 
be shaped by personal memories The idea that personal memory is important in 
shaping expectations about the self, the world and the future (“I think this way 
because of how I remember things”) is fundamental to the content and process of 
CBT (and most other forms of psychotherapy). It is also consistent with much 
academic dialogue on the nature of psychological distress (Williams, 1996; Williams, 
1997; Teasdale, Segal, & Williams, 1995; Teasdale, 1996; Brewin, 1989; Brewin, 1996). 
Whilst the status of CBT’s ‘mode-specific’ effects may still be open to question, 
consideration of the role of memory in the therapeutic process presents us with a 
subtle shift away from a directly identifiable mediator such as scores on the 
Dysfunctional Attitude Scale, to something much more subtle and interesting such as 
the way potentially depressing thoughts are reviewed, interpreted and processed. 
These changes, as Whisman (1993) proposes, may not be immediately apparent, but 
they do have a significant impact on our emotional experience, affecting the way 
that we think, feel and act. The idea that latency of retrieval might reflect effortful 
processing is certainly not new within the field of cognitive psychology (McCloskey, 
Aliminosa, & Sokol, 1991). However, the use of latency measures to infer attitudinal 
or behavioural responses in the field of social cognition is relatively new territory. 
Sheppard & Teasdale (2000) propose that there is a relationship between speed of 
processing and the type of material that is being accessed. Thus, faster responses 
reflect rapid access to ‘precomputed’ beliefs that are consistent with a particular 
attitude, whereas slower responses might indicate a higher degree of thoughtfulness 
about whether an attitude or behaviour applies to, or makes sense to that person. In 
their recent study they refer to this process as ‘metacognitive monitoring’. They 
suggest that slowing down in response to material that challenges emotional 
wellbeing reflects a controlled process. Thus the non-depressed participants were 
evaluating potential responses to each DAS item in relation to prevailing 
predominantly held beliefs. When the non-depressed participants detect a mismatch 
they double-check the response before translating it into action, hence the slowing 
of their responses. The tendency for depressed people not to do this is described as 
a ‘deficit in metacognitive monitoring’. In this study the slowing of the recovered CBT 
group in response to negative cue words on the Autobiographical Memory Test draws 
an interesting parallel with Sheppard and Teasdale’s (2000) findings. Thus, it could be 
argued that for the RCT group, the process of retrieval on this task (distant memories 
from negative cues) was for some reason, much more effortful and therefore slower 
than for the other two experimental groups, perhaps reflecting a kindred tendency 
for people who have had CBT to reject material inconsistent with their core beliefs or 
aspirations at that time. In this case the task might lead to the retrieval of distant 
negative memories, which may well make me feel bad. This fits in well with the idea 
that cognitive therapy does indeed develop cognitive skills, getting people to rethink 
dysfunctional thoughts. Memory retrieval might be particularly painful if the 
memories were from a time period which clearly predates any therapeutic change, 
hence the difference in the remote (5-10 years ago) epoch. 
As Barber & DeRubeis (1989) suggest, cognitive therapy may be effective because it 
inculcates the habit of having second thoughts about negative thoughts rather than 
accepting them as valid statements about reality. This particular notion provides the 
theoretical underpinning for a new but well researched form of treatment, 
‘Mindfulness-Based Cognitive Therapy’ (Teasdale, Segal, Williams, Ridgeway, Soulsby, 
& Lau, 2000, Segal, Williams, & Teasdale, 2002) which aims to help recovered36 
‘Mindfulness-Based Cognitive Therapy’ (Teasdale, Segal, Williams, Ridgeway, Soulsby,

& Lau, 2000, Segal, Williams, & Teasdale, 2002) which aims to help recovered

depressed patients to disengage from negative thought patterns arising in the 
presence of low mood. However, it is interesting to note that the authors of the new 
mindfulness-based approach to CBT propose that it may not be useful in the acute 
phase of a depressive episode, and that the techniques are best taught in a non-
depressed state. This suggests once again that mood plays an important role in 
determining whether we can accept these cognitive changes in the first place! 
Conclusions 
This study provided some evidence that cognitive therapy might affect the way 
people respond to negative memories. In comparison to people who were clinically 
depressed at the time of the study, people who have recovered from depression using 
cognitive therapy seem to slow down considerably when asked to retrieve a distant 
memory from a negative cue. This slowing down by RCT was more significant than 
any tendency for the CD group to ‘speed up’ to negative cues, or, for that matter, to 
slow down to positive cues, since this group showed no difference to the recovered 
antidepressant group on any of these measures. 
It goes without saying that these observations leave lots of questions unanswered 
and the conclusions must be regarded as speculative rather than concrete proof of 
anything. However, given that the two recovered groups were clearly very similar in 
terms of depression status (8.35 vs. 9.0 on the BDI-2) it must raise the questions about 
whether the effect is a result of the treatments the two groups received. It could be 
argued that educational or social differences were responsible, but these were 
analysed in detail and no obvious differences emerged. Another speculation involves 
what is sometimes referred to as the ‘differential sieve’ effect. This would contend 
that people who are appropriate for cognitive therapy are somehow ‘naturally’ 
going to behave differently than the other groups. Although this is of course 
possible, it seems a bit unlikely. From a methodological viewpoint two more charges 
could be levelled against this investigation. First, it could be argued that cross-
sectional studies do not necessarily reflect a valid change process. In other words the 
difference between RAD and RCT may be due to other, random factors and not 
therapy. The only way to counteract this argument would be to undertake a 
prospective study - following up people before and after cognitive therapy to see if 
they did indeed slow down on their recall of distant negative memories. Secondly, it 
could be argued that the effect is not specific to cognitive therapy. Thus, any form of 
talking therapy may have the same impact and it is therefore unreasonable to accord 
therapeutic rights to cognitive therapy alone. The way to test this would be to 
introduce another ‘talking therapy’ group into the study and make direct 
comparisons. This is ongoing. 
Taking all these criticisms into account, this study does suggest that CBT for 
depression really does affect the way a person thinks. A CBT survivor will tend to slow 
down on encountering certain types of negatively cued material. It would be nice (for 
practitioners and clients alike) to think that this was both a therapeutic effect and 
one that conferred some resistance to future episodes of depression. Perhaps, to 
repeat Barber & DeRubeis (1989), cognitive therapy is effective because it inculcates 
the habit of having second thoughts about negative thoughts rather than accepting 
them as valid statements about reality. In other words, it slows you down when you 
hit the bad stuff and gives you the time to think it through. 
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